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On the Theory and Practice of Fiscal Decentralization
Wallace E. Oates
     The traditional theory of public finance has made a strong case for a major role for fiscal
decentralization.  This case is based on an improved allocation of resources in the public sector. 
And it has four basic elements.  First, regional or local governments are in a position to adapt
outputs of public services to the preferences and particular circumstances of their constituencies,
as compared to a central solution which presumes that one size fits all.  Second, in a setting of
mobile households, individuals can seek out jurisdictions that provide outputs well suited to their
tastes, thereby increasing the potential gains from the decentralized provision of public services
(Tiebout 1956).  Third, in contrast to the monopolist position of the central government,
decentralized levels of government face competition from their neighbors; such competition
constrains budgetary growth and provides pressures for the efficient provision of public services. 
And fourth, decentralization may encourage experimentation and innovation as individual
jurisdictions are free to adopt new approaches to public policy; in this way, decentralization can
provide a valuable “laboratory” for fiscal experiments.  
     However, this basic economic rationale for decentralization of the public sector is not quite so
simple and compelling as it appears.  Some of the more recent literature provides, first, a
thoughtful and provocative critique of the traditional view of fiscal decentralization, and, second,
some new approaches that reveal its dark side, especially in practice.  There is emerging, in
short, a broader perspective on fiscal decentralization that raises some serious questions about its3
capacity to provide an unambiguously positive contribution to an improved performance of the
public sector.    
     My purpose in this paper is twofold.  First, I want to review the basic theory of fiscal
decentralization.  There are some loose ends to the traditional argument that open up some
intriguing issues.  Second, I want to turn to some of new literature on fiscal discipline in multi-
level government.  This literature has focused attention on some basic and destructive forces that
can undermine the economic performance of a relatively decentralized public sector.  I find it
helpful to begin by revisiting a Decentralization Theorem that I formulated long ago. As a point
of departure, I want to explain briefly why I introduced the proposition and the rationale for its
particular form and proof. 
1.  On the Decentralization Theorem and Its Motivation
     In my book (1972), I proposed a straightforward decentralization theorem that formalizes the
basic efficiency argument for the decentralized provision of certain kinds of public goods.  The
theorem lays out a set of sufficient conditions for the decentralized provision of these goods to
be Pareto-superior to a centralized determination of public outputs.   It goes as follows: 
          The Decentralization Theorem: For a public good–the consumption of which is
     defined over geographical subsets of the total population, and for which the costs of
     providing each level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for the 
     central or for the respective local government–it will always be more efficient (or at
     at least as efficient) for local governments to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of 
     output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any4
     specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions (p. 35).
The theorem seems almost trivially obvious.  But I thought it useful at the time to have a more
precise statement of the general idea for two basic reasons.  First, it provides an explicit set of
conditions under which decentralized provision is to be preferred (on efficiency grounds) to
centralized control.  As it turns out, some of the ingredients of the theorem are more problematic
than I appreciated at the time.  A reconsideration of them has opened up a whole range of
alternative approaches and new interpretations.  And, second, as explored in the appendix to the
chapter (1972, pp.54-63), one approach to proving the theorem provides a straightforward
algorithm (taken from Barzel 1969) for determining the magnitude of the welfare gains from
decentralization.  This has the added virtue of identifying the key parameters that determine the
size of the welfare gains from decentralized finance.  David Bradford and I (1974) actually
employed this approach in an exercise in which we measured the welfare gains from the
decentralized determination of school budgets in New Jersey.
     Let me begin by going back to the conditions I imposed in the theorem.  There are three
issues that I want to address here.  The first, and perhaps the most straightforward, is the matter
of interjurisdictional spillover effects (or externalities).  Second, there are the closely inter-
related issues of the mobility of individuals across jurisdictions and the precise nature of the
public good.  The third matter, one (which for good reason) has gotten much attention, is the
assumption in the theorem that the central government is constrained to provide a uniform level
of output across all jurisdictions.  I will take up each of these issues in turn.
     First,  the theorem assumes that the benefits from the consumption of the public good are
limited to those individuals within the jurisdiction where it is provided.  There are no1For a survey of this new literature, see Oates (2005).
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interjurisdictional spillover effects associated with the good.  Note that it is still a public good in
the sense that it is jointly consumed (i.e., consumed in the same quantity) by all residents of the
jurisdiction, but it has no impact on the well-being of those outside its borders.  We are all
familiar with the allocative distortions that typically occur when externalities are present, and
this assumption simply rules out any such external effects.  
     There is an interesting and related matter that arises when this condition is violated.  Suppose
we are considering an assignment problem for a particular public good.  The issue is whether or
not to make the responsibility for its  provision a central, or a “local,” government responsibility. 
If there are interjurisdictional spillover benefits present, this argues for assigning the function of
providing the public good to the central government.  But there is a cost here.  If the central
government provides a uniform output across all jurisdictions, then the welfare gains from
diversifying outputs in accord with local preferences and conditions are lost.  There is thus a
basic tradeoff in making this determination between the gains from accounting for the spillovers
through centralized provision versus the losses from tailoring outputs to local circumstances.  In
my book, I provided an informal diagrammatic treatment and discussion of this tradeoff in
chapter 2.        
     It is interesting that a tradeoff of a similar spirit emerges from some of the more recent
literature that is developing a so-called  “second-generation theory of fiscal federalism.”
1 
Drawing on a framework in which there is asymmetric information and incomplete contracts, 
Paul Seabright (1996), for example, finds that centralization can increase welfare by improving
“coordination” (by accounting for spillover effects), but this comes with a loss of2The more recent literature provides a number of new perspectives on this assignment
issue (e.g., Lockwood 2002).  In some instances, they provide a somewhat different slant on the
tradeoff between centralization and decentralization.  Eckhard Janeba and John Wilson (2003),
for example, construct a model in which in which tax competition among local governments is
the source of inefficiency in local provision, while inefficiencies at the central level have their
source in decisions by a minimum winning coalition in a central legislature.  In another
approach, Jan Brueckner (2004) poses the tradeoff in terms of the inefficiencies stemming from
local taxation versus the gains from Tiebout sorting under local provision.     
3Another (and traditional) way of addressing this problem is through a set of (Pigouvian)
taxes and subsidies that serve to internalize the external effects.  A system of properly designed
matching grants, for example, can provide the appropriate incentives to expand outputs of public
services to encompass the benefits to those outside the jurisdiction. 
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“accountability” (local control over local outcomes).  As Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate
(2003) put it, “All of this notwithstanding, the key insight remains that heterogeneity and
spillovers are correctly at the heart of the debate about the gains from centralization” (p. 2628).
2 
At any rate, my theorem disposes of the problem by simply assuming that there are no external
effects across jurisdictional lines.
3
     A second key issue in the theorem has to do with the precise nature of the public good.  Often
when treating public goods in general or those that are provided by a central government, the
assumption is made that they are pure public goods in the Samuelsonian sense that an additional
person can consume the output of the good without reducing the consumption of anyone else; in
standard parlance, consumption is said to be “non-rival.”  National defense is the ubiquitous
example.   Most of the literature in local public finance, however, has adopted a different
conception of public goods.  So-called “local public goods” (as envisioned, for example, in the
Tiebout model)  are not pure public goods: they are subject to costs of congestion.  Often the
assumption is made that they are “fully congestible” (i.e., doubling the size of the group requires
a doubling of inputs in order to maintain the level of consumption unchanged).4An interpretation of the theorem that allows mobility with respect to other non-fiscal
variables does complicate matters a bit, for it makes the population of a given jurisdiction (and
hence the pattern of efficient outputs of public goods) specific to a particular locational
equilibrium.    
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     It is interesting that the Decentralization Theorem says nothing about this matter.  It need not,
because the theorem is sufficiently general to encompass a whole range of types of public goods,
including both pure public goods and local public goods; they can be rival or non-rival in
consumption.  All that the theorem requires is that whatever the nature of these public goods, the
cost of providing a given level of output in a particular jurisdiction is the same, be the provider
the central or local government.  This does, of course, rule out any economies of scale from
central government provision.       
     However, this issue does raise some fundamental matters about how we conceptualize (or
model) the decentralization problem.  Of particular importance is what we assume about the
mobility of economic units across jurisdictional boundaries (my second issue).  The theorem
finesses this matter by assuming a complete absence of mobility.  One of the conditions specified
in the theorem is that “the consumption [of the public good] is defined over geographical subsets
of the total population.”   This implies that individuals are not able to move across jurisdictional
lines; were this not so, the geographical subsets of the population would change as people altered
their location.  This condition is a bit stronger than it need be.  What is required here is that there
be no mobility in response to changes in fiscal parameters (i.e., changes in jurisdictional outputs
of public goods or levels of taxes).  In short, this is explicitly a non-Tiebout kind of world.
4 
     In this respect, the Decentralization Theorem is quite restrictive.  Several strands of the
literature address the mobility issue explicitly and reach quite different sorts of results.  Where5For a review and assessment of the Tiebout model, its evolution, and its contribution, see
Oates (2006).
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mobility with respect to fiscal (and perhaps other) parameters exists, the precise character of the
public good becomes crucial.  In the Tiebout model, for example, there is costless mobility;
individuals seek out a jurisdiction that provides exactly the level of output of the public good
that they wish to consume.  In so doing, they reveal their preferences for “local” public outputs
and generate a Pareto-efficient outcome in the public sector.  But the properties of the public
good are critical here.  For the Tiebout model to work, the public good must be fully subject to
congestion (i.e., for each level of output, if we double the size of the population, we must double
the quantity of inputs to maintain output at an unchanged level), and individuals must pay a tax
(equivalent to a price) equal to the marginal cost of extending the output of the public good to
encompass an additional consumer.  Moreover, individual location decisions must not be
constrained by anything other than fiscal variables (not, for example, by location of
employment).  For these reasons, the Tiebout model is typically taken to apply to metropolitan
local finance, a setting in which individuals work in a particular urban setting that provides a
wide choice of city and suburban jurisdictions in which to reside.
5
     If the set of local tax-prices facing mobile individuals does not faithfully reflect marginal
costs, then problems arise because location decisions can involve external costs on other persons
in both the originating jurisdiction and destination (Buchanan and Wagner 1970).  In an
influential paper, Flatters, Henderson, and Meiszkowski (1974) departed from the Tiebout
assumption by taking the public good to be a pure public good within the jurisdiction in which it
is provided and by requiring that individuals must work in the same jurisdiction in which they6This issue has received extensive attention in Canada, where the treatment of oil
revenues in the oil-rich provinces has been a contentious matter at both national and regional
levels.  This has provided some of the motivation for a major Canadian program of fiscal
equalization among the provinces.  For a formal analysis of the problem, see Robin Boadway
and Frank Flatters (1982).    
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reside. [On account of this latter condition, I prefer to call FHM  a “regional model” in contrast
to Tiebout’s “local model.”]  In this particular regional model, an individual’s entry into a
jurisdiction reduces the cost of providing the public good to other residents by the amount of the
entrant’s tax payment.  However, by increasing the stock of labor in the jurisdiction, the entrant
drives down the marginal product of labor, and, hence, the wage.  Because these effects involve
“external” elements, a locational equilibrium in the model is not, in general, Pareto-efficient.  A
specific form of subsidy payments is needed to internalize the external costs and benefits
associated with individual location decisions.
     My basic point here is that the assumptions we make about mobility and about the nature of
the public good interact in important ways in determining the kind of outcomes we obtain.  And
we must think carefully about the settings in which we apply these models.  The Tiebout model,
for example, may provide a reasonably good description of behavior in a metropolitan setting
(Fischel 2001).  In contrast, the FHM model has been helpful in understanding some of the
issues where different regions have widely varying endowments of natural resources that affect
both the productivity of private agents and the availability of tax bases.
6
     My third issue concerns the nature of central government provision of local public goods.  It
may help to be a bit more precise on this.  In equation (1), let G be a vector of outputs of public
goods where an element, gi , is the level of public output in the i
th jurisdiction:
(1)     G = G(g1, g2, ..., gn)7For purposes of measuring the welfare gains from fiscal decentralization, I took g0 to be
arithmetic mean of the demands of all the individuals in the country (Oates 1972, pp. 59-63.) 
10
The Decentralization Theorem equates  “centralized provision” with a uniform level of public
outputs (say g0) across all jurisdictions; the theorem thus requires that gi=gj=g0 for all i,j.
7 This
obviously served my purposes quite well in the theorem by providing a benchmark against which
to compare (favorably) a varied, decentralized pattern of outputs of public goods.  But this
condition has been contested in the literature.  Why should we expect the central government to
provide equal levels of public outputs in all jurisdictions?  Why can’t the central government
simply provide the efficient level of output in each jurisdiction?
     The rationale (or defense) for this constraint has taken two forms.  First, there is an
information issue: the argument is that local governments are closer to their constituencies. 
They have a knowledge of local preferences that the center cannot easily come by.  It is hard for
a central government to know the diverse preferences in the myriad of jurisdictions that
constitute the country as a whole.  In short, there is an asymmetry of information: local
governments know local preferences; the central government does not.   The second line of
defense for this assumption is more political in character.  It suggests that there are political
constraints on the center that prevent it from varying local outputs.  There is a national sense of
equal treatment that makes it difficult for a central government to provide more generous levels
of public outputs in some jurisdictions than in others.
     But these arguments are not fully convincing.  We see in the real world a variety of “pork-
barrel” projects under which central agents deliver special public programs to their own
constituencies.  But even at a more formal level, there is really nothing, in principle, to prevent8There is a kind of semantic issue here.  In my earlier book (1972), I characterized an
economic definition of federal government as one in which outcomes at decentralized levels “are
determined largely by the demands for these [public] services of the residents...of the respective
jurisdiction” (p. 17). I contrasted this with political definitions of federalism that focus more on
political autonomy, often expressed in the form of a constitution.  The point here is that one can
associate “decentralization” either with the nature of the outcomes or with the process by which
these outcomes are determined.  In this sense, I suppose one could characterize the prefect
system (from an economic perspective) as possessing important “federal elements.”. 
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the central government from obtaining the needed information on local cost functions and
preferences (albeit costly to gather such information) and then to provide the Pareto-efficient
level of output in each jurisdiction.   In fact, central government responsibility for local public
goods does not, in practice, rule out such sensitivity to local conditions.  Under some
administrative structures, the center may confer on their local agents both the responsibility and
the authority to be responsive to local circumstances in their determination of local programs. 
Albert Breton and Pierre Salmon (forthcoming) describe the French system of administration
under which prefects (appointed by the center) have the capacity and incentive to adapt national
policies to local conditions.  Thus, an outcome that is decentralized in spirit can, in principle,
emerge from a structure of government with little in the way of real local autonomy.
8
     Some of the more recent literature has taken an entirely different tack on this whole issue. 
Lockwood (2002) and  Besley and Coate (2003), for example, envision the determination of
local outputs under a centralized system as taking place through the decisions of a central
legislature, whose members are elected representatives of the individual jurisdictions.  In such a
setting, the elements of the vector G in equation (1) are set by the central legislative process,
which can involve various kinds of logrolling and electoral maneuvers.   This can give the
problem a quite different character.  If, for instance, the vector G is determined centrally by a12
minimum winning coalition in the legislature, allocative distortions occur that work to the
disadvantage of those jurisdictions outside the coalition.  Nevertheless, if spillovers in the
provision of local public goods are sufficiently pervasive, a centralized outcome may still
dominate a decentralized one.             The more general point here is that the Decentralization
Theorem invokes a very strong condition or constraint on the central provision of public goods
that makes it fairly easy to establish a presumption in favor of the decentralized provision of
these goods (assuming an absence of significant spillover effects or large economies of scale). 
The problem of centralized versus decentralized provision can become much more complex
when centralized outcomes are characterized in a more thoughtful way.
2.  On Measuring the Welfare Gains from Fiscal Decentralization
     The Decentralization Theorem also suggests a straightforward way to generate a cardinal
measure of the welfare gains from the decentralized provision of public goods.  Using an
approach suggested by Yoram Barzel (1969), one can provide a proof of the theorem by simply
maximizing the sum of consumer surpluses from provision of the good (Oates 1972, pp. 59-63). 
This approach can be employed to measure the welfare gains from decentralization by simply
calculating the  difference between the level of aggregate consumer surplus under decentralized
and centralized provision of the good.  
     Such an exercise, in addition to providing some sense of the size of the potential welfare
gains from fiscal decentralization, has the further virtue of identifying the key parameters upon
which these gains depend.  Returning to the theorem, suppose that the costs of providing a unit
of the good per person are the same across all jurisdictions.  The only source of welfare gains in9It is interesting to note that this is precisely the opposite result from the case of
deadweight losses in taxation. For the tax case, we all learn that the welfare losses from an
excise tax on a specific good (at least in a partial-equilibrium framework) become larger as
demand curves become more price elastic, because a given tax causes a larger response
(distortion) in terms of the change in quantity purchased.  In contrast, the welfare losses from
fiscal centralization are greater, the more price inelastic is the demand curve, because given
changes in quantities on the horizontal axis moving away from an efficient level generate greater
losses in consumer surplus where demand curves are relatively steep.     
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this case comes from diversifying outputs across jurisdictions in accordance with the differing
demands for the local public good.  It is straightforward to show for this case (Oates 1997) that
the magnitude of the welfare gains depends on the variation in demand across jurisdictions and
on the price elasticity of demand for the good.  The greater the differences in the efficient levels
of output across the jurisdictions themselves, the more there is to gain from allowing each
jurisdiction to provide its own efficient output level.  Perhaps less obvious is the fact that the
price elasticity of demand is a key parameter here.  In particular, the more price inelastic the
demand for the public good, the greater the gains from decentralization.
9
     David Bradford and I (1974) employed this method in an exercise in which we estimated the
potential welfare losses from moving from a system of decentralized school finance to one which
imposed equal spending per pupil across all jurisdictions.  Using a body of data on school
finance from New Jersey, we first estimated a demand curve for per-pupil expenditure.  We then
took the observed spending per-pupil in each school district to be that which the local population
desired (i.e., the efficient level).  As our benchmark for centralized provision, we simply
aggregated the school budgets across all jurisdictions and divided by the total number of pupils
to get our figure for per-pupil expenditure for the case of centralized school finance.  Since there
was wide variation in expenditure per pupil within our sample ($295 to $547) and since our10For surveys of this econometric literature, see Rubinfeld (1987) and Oates (1996).
11The Decentralization Theorem assumes that cost functions for local public services are
identical across all jurisdictions.  It thus focuses solely on differences in demand as the source of
welfare gains from fiscal decentralization.
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estimate of the price elasticity was low (-0.36), it is not surprising that we found the welfare
losses from the centralization of school spending to be quite large.  Our calculations suggested
that the average deadweight loss associated with moving a dollar of expenditure from a high-
spending district to a low-spending district was on the order of 50 cents.
     This estimate assumes, of course, that there are no external effects associated with local
school spending, an assumption one might well question.  More generally, this approach has an
admitted tendency toward large estimates of the welfare losses from fiscal centralization.  First,
it uses as a benchmark the assumption of uniform provision across jurisdictions under a
centralized regime; it thus provides no scope whatsoever for the central authority to adapt
outputs to local circumstances.  And, second, it assumes fully efficient local decision-making by
presuming that the observed outputs under decentralization are at Pareto-efficient levels.  It is
worth noting, in this context, that these kinds of measures are also likely to produce large
estimates of welfare losses from centralization because the existing estimates of the price
elasticity of demand for local public goods typically suggest highly price-inelastic demands. 
There is now a large body of econometric estimates of demand functions for a wide range of
local public services, and they typically find price elasticities on the order of -0.3 to -0.5.
10    
     Even if there is no variation in demands across jurisdictions, fiscal decentralization can
produce welfare gains where costs vary, since with given demands, differing costs will result in
differences in efficient levels of output.
11  Such variation in the costs of providing local public12This is like the case of distorting taxes in that the source of the variation manifests itself
on the price, rather than the quantity, axis.
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services can come from either of two sources.  First, there may be actual differences in the
production functions among jurisdictions.  The costs, for example, of providing clean, clear
roads are likely to be lower in areas where there is relatively mild weather than where winter
(and summer) storms make road-clearing operations a more formidable task.  Second, there is an
altogether different and  interesting source of variation in the cost per person of providing local
services: the congestion properties of the public service.  Suppose, for example, that the local
public good is a pure public good within the jurisdiction in which it is provided.  Then it will be
less expensive per person to provide a given output in a relatively populous jurisdiction.  And,
hence, the efficient level of output, other things equal, will be higher in such a jurisdiction.
     It is easy to see for the case of varying costs that the gains from fiscal decentralization depend
on the magnitude of the variation in costs across jurisdictions and, once again, on the price
elasticity of demand (Oates 1997).  But for this case, these welfare gains are greater, the more
price elastic are the demand functions–just the opposite of the case where differences in efficient
levels of output have their source in variation in demand.
12  Thus, the impact of the price
responsiveness of demand on the magnitude of the welfare gains from decentralization depends
on whether the divergences in efficient levels of local outputs have their source in differences in
demands across jurisdictions or differences in costs.  
     An especially dramatic case of  welfare losses from centralization with their source in cost
differentials emerged a few years ago in the debate over the Environmental Protection Agency’s13More generally, the removal of contaminants from drinking water involves processes
that exhibit huge differences in cost per person across water districts of different population
sizes.  See U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1997) and Dinan, Cropper, and Portney (1999) for
studies that explore the case for decentralized standard setting for safe drinking water. .
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new “arsenic rule” for safe drinking water.
13  The removal of contaminants from drinking water
involves processes with enormous economies of scale (in terms of population).  It is typically
much less expensive per person to provide safe drinking water in heavily populated areas than in
those with fewer people.  In this case, the EPA introduced a new and much tougher standard for
arsenic concentrations in drinking water.  The estimated benefits were quite modest.  The
problem was that the average cost per household to attain the standard varied from under $1 per
household per annum in large water systems (like New York City) to over $300 per household in
the smallest systems.  In benefit-cost terms, the new rule may have been defensible for large
water districts, but (based on then-available estimates) the rule promised large welfare losses for
smaller districts (Oates 2002).  The setting of environmental standards in the U.S. often involves
a single standard for all jurisdictions (a one-size-fits-all approach); following this precedent, the
EPA’s new standard was imposed on all water districts.  However, as this case makes clear, a
more decentralized approach to the setting of standards for many dimensions of environmental
quality makes lots of economic sense.
     The traditional economic case for fiscal (and regulatory) decentralization is thus founded on
the potential welfare gains from diversifying local public outputs in accordance with local
circumstances (encompassing both differences in preferences and costs).  And the existing (if
small) empirical literature suggests that these gains can be quite large.  An optimal fiscal
structure from this perspective is one in which a central government provides outputs of those14Remy Prud’homme (1995) and Vito Tanzi (1996) raised a range of specific concerns
regarding the dangers inherent in fiscal decentralization.  
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public goods that are truly national in scope and decentralized levels of governments determine
the appropriate levels of outputs of those public services whose consumption is limited to
residents of their respective jurisdictions.  In practice, however, there is much more to the story. 
To achieve efficient outcomes requires a set of public decision-making institutions that provides
the needed incentives for effective budgetary choices.  Much of the more recent literature
suggests that this much easier said than done.  And to this I turn next.
3.  On Fiscal Institutions and Decentralization
     The earlier literature in fiscal federalism recognized the potential for distorted outcomes
under certain spatial patterns of benefits from local public services and particular forms of
taxation.  In his seminal work on tax-exporting, Charles McLure (1967, 1969), for example,
provided estimates of the extent to which various taxes levied in one state (or jurisdiction) were
actually borne by residents elsewhere.  McLure went on to develop the welfare implications of
tax-exporting, pointing out that since local decision-makers could expect outsiders to finance
some portion of their local budget, there would exist incentives for excessive local expenditure. 
But it is in the more recent literature that the “dark side” of fiscal decentralization has been
spelled out more fully.
14  This has been prompted, it seems to me, by two developments.  First,
we have seen several major fiscal and economic collapses (such as those in Argentina and
Brazil), as well as more low-grade but persistent fiscal malfunctioning, that have important roots
in the vertical structure of the public sector and, more particularly, in the behavior of15There has emerged a large literature on corruption in the public sector, much of it
empirical in character.  One of the important questions posed in this literature is whether
corruption is likely to be a more serious problem at the central or at decentralized levels of
government.  My reading suggests the jury is still out on the answer to this question.
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decentralized fiscal authorities.  This has prompted a careful examination of just what has gone
wrong.  Second, there have been important advances in the theory of fiscal structure and its
operation that draw upon the new theory of the firm (e.g., Cremer, Estache, and Seabright 1996). 
The recognition that asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, and the associated “agency
costs” manifest themselves in public, as well as private, sector institutions has opened up a
whole new perspective on fiscal decentralization.
     A major issue in this literature is the “raiding of the fiscal commons.” This is not just a matter
of corruption.
15  Such destructive behavior derives directly from the incentives that the political
and fiscal system create for both public officials and the electorate.  The very structure of
intergovernmental finance in certain countries makes such behavior almost inevitable.    
     The source of these “raids” is the presence of “soft budget constraints.”  The term itself
comes from the seminal work of Janos Kornai (1979, 1980).  Kornai originally introduced the
term to describe the setting of state-owned enterprise in socialist countries, where managers
could depend on the central government to bail them out of financial difficulties.  This created an
environment in which these managers could preside over chronic financial losses with little to
fear from higher authorities.  The scope of the term has, more recently, been broadened to
encompass a range of economic entities whose financial losses will be underwritten by some
form of “supporting organization” (Kornai, Maskin, and Roland 2003).  For my purposes here,
the term can be understood to refer to lower levels of government who operate with the19
expectation that their fiscal deficits will be covered by a higher level (often the central)
government.  This is thus a world in which provincial (state) governors or local mayors can
expect fiscal bailouts from higher-level authorities; they need not, in short, keep their fiscal
houses in order.
     The key issue here is the source of such expectations. Since such bailouts can obviously
undermine responsible fiscal decision-making, how is it that a fiscal system can come to embody
such a perverse set of expectations?  The literature typically explains this phenomenon in terms
of some kind of sequential, game-theoretic framework (e.g., Wildasin 1997; Qian and Roland
1998; Goodspeed 2002).  In the first stage of the game, the central government commits itself to
a sensible, no-bailout position; it states explicitly that it will not come to the fiscal rescue of
lower levels of government running deficits in their budgets.  In the second stage of the game,
decentralized officials must decide whether or not this claim is credible.  And, as the literature
makes clear, there are plenty of reasons why these officials may not find the center’s claim to be
persuasive.  First, the central government presumably cares about the welfare of the citizenry
(either for altruistic reasons or in order to be re-elected).  The failure of a provincial or local
government can have serious consequences not only for the well-being of its residents, but for
others as well.  As David Wildasin (1997) has argued, such fiscal malfunctions can have
important spillover effects on other jurisdictions.  Moreover, in the complexity of hierarchical
politics, governors or mayors may be in a position to shift the blame for their fiscal crises onto
central public officials.  Thus, the very political survival of central incumbents may well depend
on their coming to the aid of lower-level fiscal authorities.
     This is further complicated by the potentially important “insurance role” of the central20
government.  As Lockwood (1999) and others have argued, there will be times when
decentralized governments come under fiscal distress that has purely external origins.  The
central government can, under such circumstances, provide valuable assistance that will soften
the impact of these external “shocks.”  But (as with insurance in the private sector) there can be a
real moral-hazard problem here.  Especially in a contentious political setting, it may not always
be easy to distinguish clearly fiscal deficits that have their source in external shocks from those
that result from poor fiscal management. 
     For a complex of reasons, decentralized governments may thus decide that the center’s claim
to a no-bailout position is not credible.  In consequence, they may proceed in the second stage of
the game to expand the budget beyond levels for which they have funding in the expectation that
central officials will come to their rescue with grants or loans. [If, alternatively, decentralized
governments find the center’s commitment to a no-bailout strategy to be persuasive and behave
responsibly in fiscal terms, the game ends at this juncture.] Confronted by these provincial or
local deficits, the central authority must then decide whether or not to come to the rescue with
additional financial resources.  And, as we have discussed, there may often be compelling
reasons (both economic and political ones) for a bailout.
     This raises the crucial issue of the structural source of these perverse expectations.  What are
the elements in a fiscal and political system that create an environment which undermines fiscal
discipline?  There is a not a simple answer to this question.  In a fascinating and enlightening set
of case studies,  Jonathan Rodden, Gunnar Eskeland, and Jennie Litvack (2003) suggest that soft
budget constraints typically have a multiplicity of sources that encompass existing fiscal
institutions, the structure of the political system, the absence (or weakness) of certain key21
markets, and the specific history of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the country.  In short,
each nation has its own story to tell.  But there are some important lessons here.  For example, as
Rodden at al. point out, soft budget constraints frequently arise in settings where fiscal
responsibility is ill defined.  In some countries, there exist serious ambiguities about which level
of government is responsible for providing certain services (such as health care or pensions) or at
least the funding of them.  Where spending and revenue authority and responsibility are not
clearly defined, there may be good reason for governors or mayors to expect fiscal assistance
from higher levels.  In short,  Rodden et al. find that “unclear or shared responsibilities have a
cost in terms of accountability and incentives” (p. 16).  
     Soft budget constraints are also more likely where decentralized levels of government have
weak tax systems and rely heavily on higher levels of governments for fiscal transfers.  Rodden
et al. describe such a setting as involving “transfer dependency.” In order to make the tough
fiscal decisions and weigh the benefits against the costs of new or expanded programs, public
officials need to be in a position of raising the monies from their constituencies through their
own state and local tax systems.  A heavy reliance on transfers creates incentives for turning to
an expansion of these transfers rather than increasing taxes in one’s own jurisdiction.
     Another major element of soft budget constraints is often debt finance.  One way to fund a
potential deficit (if assistance is not directly forthcoming from above) is through the issue of
bonds.  There are numerous instances, for example, in which powerful provincial governors (in
countries like Argentina) have had access to the public banking system (or other state-owned
enterprises) to absorb their bond issues.  In such a setting, public officials can simply sell the
requisite bonds to regional or national banks to cover prospective deficits.  Soft budget16As Wildasin (2004) discusses, there is typically an intimate relationship between
intergovernmental transfers and public debt.  An increase in transfers from the center may often
be financed by an increase in the center’s deficit so that central borrowing may effectively
substitute for borrowing at decentralized levels of government.
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constraints thus often manifest themselves both in terms of transfer dependency and a poorly
functioning banking system that is subject to manipulation by public officials for funding
deficits.
16    
     The absence of a strong and effective set of private markets constitutes a further impediment
to a system of hard budget constraints.  Well developed, and efficient capital markets, for
example, can provide needed fiscal discipline by imposing higher borrowing costs and limiting
access to credit for provincial or local governments that perform poorly.  Similarly, an effective
set of land markets in the presence of mobile factors of production can support sound fiscal
decision-making through the capitalization of superior or poor fiscal performance (encompassing
the quality of local outputs and levels of local taxation) into local property values.  Thus, a
strong system of private markets can itself be an important contributor toward a hardening of
budget constraints.
     In addition, there is the critical matter of history and precedents. The U.S. experience is
instructive in this regard.  Reviewing the U.S. history with a system of relatively hard budget
constraints, Robert Inman (2003) argues that the U.S. record which, since the founding of the
Republic and the War of 1812, is essentially clean of any strategic bailouts, owes much to an
important historical episode.  In the 1840s, a wave of defaults occurred encompassing eight
states and the Republic of Florida as a result of poorly conceived public investments in
transportation and banking projects.  The federal government explicitly rejected efforts by these17Another mechanism for the hardening of budget constraints is a system of explicit rules
on fiscal behavior that introduces measures such as a balanced-budget restriction on the current
account.  The limitations on deficit spending and levels of public debt embodied in the Stability
and Growth Pact as part of European monetary union appear to have had some impact on
restraining public spending in various EMU countries (Franco et al, 2003).  There is also a large
literature on fiscal rules in the U.S. states that suggests that appropriately designed measures can
have some effect in constraining budgetary behavior.  
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states to obtain fiscal assistance.  Congress said no–and this historically put an end to any real
prospects for strategic fiscal bailouts.  The point here is that a refusal to provide such assistance
can build upon itself and create a setting where expectations of bailouts no longer have much
foundation.  History, in short, matters.
     At any rate, building a system of hard budget constraints is clearly a formidable (but by no
means impossible) task that involves dimensions not only of the fiscal system, narrowly defined,
but also of political and market structure.
17  This is truly a problem in “political economy.”  In
my remaining space, I want to delve briefly into three aspects of this issue.  The first is the topic
of intergovernmental grants, a fundamental source of soft budget constraints.  The second is the
issue of political structure and fiscal responsibility.  And the third is the complex inter-
relationship between markets, politics, and fiscal performance.
     As we have discussed, Rodden at al. (2003) identify “transfer dependency” as one of the
predominant sources of soft budget constraints.  This issue actually has a long history in the
literature on fiscal federalism where it has been called the problem of “vertical fiscal imbalance.” 
There is, I think, fairly general agreement that for a sound fiscal system, the various levels of
government need their own sources of tax revenues.  Proposals for additional spending need to
be evaluated in a setting in which benefits are weighed against their costs, and having to rely on
own revenues (rather than transfers) provides incentives for a more careful balancing of these24
two sides of the ledger.  A condition of vertical fiscal imbalance (or “transfer dependency”) is
said to exist where own-revenue systems are weak and lower level governments rely heavily on
transfers from above.
     The issue here is the extent and nature of a sensible system of intergovernmental grants.  It is
important to recognize at the outset that nearly all systems of multi-level government finance
incorporate significant grant programs and that there is an explicit, and quite compelling,
rationale for their role.  Public-finance economists have traditionally seen such grants as serving
two basic purposes.  First, in the Pigouvian tradition, they provide a needed incentive for lower
level governments to expand public outputs that have important spillover effects into other
jurisdictions.  The appropriate fiscal instrument here is a matching grant that serves to internalize
the spillover benefits.  Second, there exist major programs of fiscal equalization in most federal
countries (although not at the federal level in the U.S.) that serve to transfer resources to
relatively poor regions.  These are typically justified on redistributive grounds or, more recently,
in terms of providing a more “level playing field” for interjurisdictional competition.  In
addition, to these two functions, it is often pointed out that the central government may have a
kind of comparative advantage in raising tax revenues.  Nationwide taxes (with uniform
provisions and rates), so the argument goes, have fewer distortionary effects on flows of mobile
resources than do state and local taxes with differing rates, definitions of tax base, etc. 
Moreover, this permits a higher degree of progressivity in the tax structure, which promotes
distributive objectives.  There may also be some (modest) economies of scale in tax
administration.  So the argument here is that we can have a better overall tax system if we rely
more heavily on the central government and use transfers to provide some portion of state and25
local funds.    
     The tough question here is whether or not an extensive system of such intergovernmental
transfers is consistent with a fiscal structure with hard budget constraints that encourages
efficient fiscal decisions.   This is not an easy question to answer.  Let me consider first the case
against intergovernmental transfers.  We have already seen the concern raised by Rodden et al.
and others that such transfers can easily become an instrument that governments abuse in the
pursuit of fiscal bailouts.  In addition, there is some troubling evidence that intergovernmental
grants often do not function as the normative theory would have them do, even in the context of
a system of relatively hard budget constraints.  Studies in the U.S., for example, suggest that
where such transfers presumably have a role in internalizing interjurisdictional spillover effects,
they have not done so very effectively.  The design of many of these programs runs counter to
this objective (Oates 2004).  For example, for many years, the federal matching grants for
interstate highway construction (a major grant program) involved a cost-sharing formula under
which the federal government’s share was 90 percent of construction costs.  Such a federal
matching share surely far overstates the fraction of benefits accruing to other states.  Moreover,
most federal matching-grant programs (in the U.S. at least) have had “caps” at fairly modest
levels of expenditure.  Once the cap is reached, federal cost-sharing ceases, and there is no
incentive at the margin for any expansion of the program.  More generally, Inman (1988), in a
study of U.S. federal grant programs to state and local governments, found that the basic
economic objectives of efficiency and equity do not take us very far in explaining the actual
structure and functioning of the federal grant system.  He had much more success in explaining18See also Shama Gamkhar (2002).
19Likewise, Ronald McKinnon (1997) and McKinnon and Thomas Nechyba (1997)  have
suggested  that fiscal equalization has, in several countries, impeded the standard process of
“equalization through competition.”  
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(econometrically) the pattern of grant allocations using a model of political influence.
18  
     As we have noted, another basic role for intergovernmental transfers is fiscal equalization.  In
many federal countries like Canada, Australia, and Germany, there are major programs to
transfer resources from more wealthy jurisdictions to those with relatively small tax bases (and,
perhaps, high fiscal need).  But these programs too can have perverse and unintended
consequences.  In an intriguing recent study, Fabio Padovano (forthcoming) looks at the process
of income convergence among regions, where he contrasts the experience of the U.S., a country
with essentially no fiscal equalization by the federal government, with that of Italy, where there
have been large fiscal transfers from the wealthy North to the South.  Padovano finds that in the
U.S. the process of income convergence has proceeded expeditiously as economic theory would
predict with a movement of industry and employment to relatively low-wage areas and a
consequent narrowing of interregional income differentials over time.  This process of income
convergence has not happened in Italy.  Padovano argues that this is largely the result of the
transfer system which has muted the incentives for the factor movements that generate
convergence.
19  
     While a more systematic and comprehensive review of the experience with intergovernmental
transfers goes beyond the scope of this paper, there is surely enough here to suggest that these
grant systems have often not been designed properly, frequently have not functioned very well,
and in some cases have had perverse, if unintended, consequences.  The case against grants,27
based on their actual use, is not easily dismissed.
     At the same time, I am reluctant to throw out intergovernmental transfers as simply a bad idea
in practice.  They have an important  raison d’etre, and there are ways to address their ills. 
Moreover, they are firmly entrenched; we probably are destined to live with them, whether we
want to or not.  The issue is how to make them work better.  The two key matters here are those
of proper design and proper use.  In terms of design, they must provide a set of incentives
consistent with their objectives.  Most notably, they must not encourage poor fiscal practices.  As
one example, Rodden et al. (2003) point out that the mandated German formula for fiscal
equalization makes it clear to the smaller and poorer states that poor fiscal performance will be
rewarded with increased transfers (p. 443).  This is obviously a recipe for undermining fiscal
discipline.  In practice, moreover, a grant system needs to be transparent and predictable.  There
needs to be a well understood set of rules such that the system cannot be “gamed” to one’s own
advantage.  This may well involve limiting the discretion of the central government in the
distribution of funds so as to preclude political manipulation of grant distributions.  This is
obviously a topic for an extended treatment in its own right.  The design and operation of an
effective system of intergovernmental grants ranks, in my view, right at the top of the research
agenda in fiscal federalism. 
     A second issue on which I want to comment briefly is the intimate relationship between fiscal
behavior and politics.  The fiscal system is embedded in a larger political system, and the way in
which fiscal decentralization works clearly depends on political, as well as fiscal, institutions. 
This has been the subject both of some important theoretical and empirical work.  I mentioned
earlier the papers by Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) in which central28
legislatures, composed of locally elected representatives, determine the vector of local public
outputs described in equation (1).  Depending on how the legislature behaves (e.g., a minimum-
winning coalition or a “cooperative” outcome), the pattern of local outputs will exhibit different
sorts of distortions.  Paul Seabright (1996) has taken a somewhat different tack in a model in
which an incumbent central government determines the vector of local outputs in such a way as
to maximize the probability of its re-election.  The crucial variable for each local jurisdiction in
this approach is the probability that the jurisdiction is decisive (or “pivotal”) in determining the
election of the central government.  Localities for which this probability is relatively high
obviously tend to get more favorable treatment in terms of relatively high levels of local public
outputs.  These are simply a few examples of a larger body of ongoing theoretical work in which
we find that local fiscal outcomes depend in crucial ways on how the political system works.
     The critical role of political structure also comes through clearly in recent empirical work.  In
the illuminating collection of country studies to which I have made frequent reference, Rodden
et al. (2003) find that certain properties or characteristics of the political system have profound
implications for the presence or absence of hard budget constraints for decentralized levels of
government.  Most notably, they find that in countries, where the central legislature is itself a
loose coalition of regional interests, budget constraints tend to be relatively soft with sometimes
devastating results (as in the cases of Argentina and Brazil).  In such a setting, fiscal outcomes
have sometimes been the result of extensive logrolling behavior among regional interests that
result in fiscal bailouts for decentralized authorities.  This work leads to the rather paradoxical
and ironical finding that for fiscal decentralization to function effectively, there is a real need for
a strong central government with a sufficient presence to be able to resist opportunistic moves by20See, for example, Weingast (1995), Qian and Weingast (1997), McKinnon (1997), and
Weingast (forthcoming).
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provincial and local interests.  A weak center, in short, is often an integral part of a fiscal system
with soft budget constraints and poor performance.
     My third, and final, topic is the even bigger picture that brings together the whole
constellation of fiscal structure, the political system, and market institutions.  The general point
here is that, in the end, fiscal performance emerges from this larger system.  Barry Weingast and
his co-authors have stressed the fundamental interdependence of the private and public sectors in
their work and have been able to tie various elements together in terms of what they call
“market-preserving federalism.”
20  On the one hand, an effective system of markets requires a
supportive political and fiscal environment.  One of the basic threats to efficient markets is the
encroachment of powerful political interests.  “Preserving markets requires that the state be
effective yet limited” (Qian and Weingast, pp. 83-4).  On the other hand, efficient markets
contribute to hard budget constraints and improved fiscal performance.  From the Weingast et al.
perspective, this crucial interdependence is best addressed in terms of a decentralized public
sector in which regulatory and fiscal  powers are diffused among state and local entities. 
Competition among these decentralized authorities restricts their capacity to intrude on the
efficient operation of markets.  Efficient markets, in turn, constrain the fiscal activities of public-
sector agents.    As we noted earlier, in a setting with mobile factors and relatively efficient land
and credit markets, poor fiscal performance will penalize a jurisdiction through restricting local
government access to credit markets, raising the interest rates on local public debt, and through
the capitalization of the poor quality of local outputs and high taxes into local property values. 21In their illuminating study of fiscal decentralization in Canada, Richard Bird and Almos
Tassonyi (2003) argue that an objective examination of fiscal structure suggests that Canadian
provinces should have relatively soft budget constraints.  Yet provincial fiscal behavior has not
been characterized by opportunistic raiding of the commons.  They suggest that this is largely the
result of a political system that limits provincial influence in the central legislature and of strong
markets.  In addition, they note that national temperament may itself be important.  They contend
that “...generally prudent fiscal behavior has become an institutionalized norm in Canada, in part
30
There is thus a kind of mutual reinforcement between markets and fiscal decentralization that
enhances the performance of both the private and public sectors of the economy and that gives
them a “self-enforcing” character.  Weingast (1995) suggests that we can find historical
examples of such systems in 18
th century England and in the United States in the 19
th century.
     The essence of such systems is a combination of fiscal and market institutions that provides a
set of incentives to individual agents for efficient behavior.  A relatively decentralized public
sector, characterized by competition among jurisdictions in a setting of a common market
without barriers to trade, can provide a powerful inducement for public decision-makers to
behave in ways that promote the welfare of their constituencies and sustain the efficient
performance of private markets.  
     There is, however, no detailed, universal blueprint for the optimal system.  As we have seen,
the construction of a viable and efficient structure involves a delicate balancing act.  A self-
sustaining system must, on the one hand, be sufficiently decentralized to promote competition
among jurisdictions and to limit the capacity of the center to undermine the efficient operation of
markets.  At the same time, however, the central government must be strong enough to resist
credibly moves by decentralized agents to raid the commons.  The right balance is likely to vary
somewhat from nation to nation depending on the particular history and character of the
country.
21  The political economy of fiscal decentralization is thus a very complicated andbecause fiscal profligacy...has not proven an effective long-run electoral strategy” (p. 113) 
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challenging issue.  As Wildasin (2004) indicates, it offers us a rich research agenda with a
potentially enormous payoff. 32
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